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Religious Accommodations and the Common Good
Mark David Hall, PhD
Abstract

Citizens, civic leaders, and jurists interested in good public policy
should look to history as a guide to the impact of laws and constitutional provisions aimed at protecting religious actors. American civic
leaders and jurists, at both the national and state levels, have long created significant protections for religious Americans who object to neutral, generally applicable laws. At their best, Americans have agreed
that government should not force individuals to violate their sincerely
held religious convictions unless it has compelling reasons for doing so.
Moreover, the nation and the states have still been able to achieve important policy objectives in spite of these accommodations. America’s
laudable history of protecting religious citizens from otherwise valid
laws makes it clear not only that it is possible to protect “the sacred
rights of conscience” and promote the common good, but also that religious accommodations themselves promote the common good.

A

merica has a long history of accommodating citizens who find
their religious convictions at odds with government regulations
and mandates. Starting in the colonial era, legislators, statesmen,
and jurists have crafted accommodations to protect people of faith
from neutral, generally applicable laws that nevertheless burden the
free exercise of religion even in such areas of extreme importance as
national defense, education, drug use, health care, and civil rights.
The explosive growth of government at both the state and
national levels in the 20th century has made accommodations even
more important for protecting religious actors. Because religious
liberty has been highly valued by both Democrats and Republicans,
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Historically, there has been a
broad consensus among Americans that religious actors should
be protected against otherwise
valid laws unless the state has a
compelling interest. This consensus may be unraveling.
Religious liberty is a core American principle. Many accommodations have been passed with
significant bipartisan support,
and both conservative and liberal
jurists have supported judicially
created accommodations.
The national and state governments often create accommodations to protect religious individuals from neutral, generally
applicable laws, but this does not
exhaust the state’s interest in protecting religious citizens and does
not prevent states from achieving
important policy objectives.
Legislators have passed laws to
protect religious citizens from
discrimination by both private
and governmental entities.
As the nation and the states
address new threats to what
the Founders called “the sacred
rights of conscience,” they
should consider past lessons as
they make laws and policies.

legislatures have routinely crafted accommodations
to protect religious individuals. By one count from the
early 1990s, there were approximately 2,000 federal
or state laws that accommodated religious citizens.1
In virtually all of these cases, there is little evidence
that these accommodations have harmed other
individuals or kept either the states or the nation
from meeting significant policy objectives. America’s
laudable history of protecting religious citizens from
otherwise valid laws makes it clear not only that it is
possible to protect “the sacred rights of conscience”
and promote the common good, but also that religious
accommodations themselves promote the common good.

For example, a state may determine that beards
could be used to conceal contraband or to help
prisoners escape and so ban inmates from growing them. Yet this neutral, generally applicable rule
would keep Muslim prisoners who believe that their
faith requires them to grow beards from following
the dictates of their religion. What should be done?
One possibility would be to abolish the regulation
altogether, but assuming that the policy advances
its intended goals, such a solution detracts from the
common good. Alternatively, the religious convictions of Muslim prisoners could simply be ignored.

Why Accommodations?

For at least the past 60 years, the
chief threats to religious liberty in
America have come from general laws
or policies aimed at advancing the
common good that unintentionally
burden religious actors.

Virtually every civic leader in the American
Founding agreed that governments, in the words of
James Madison, should not compel “men to worship
God in any manner contrary to their conscience.”2 By
the late 20th century, it was a rare legislative body
that would even consider explicitly dictating or banning a religious practice.
In one of these extraordinary cases, the town of
Hialeah, Florida, banned the slaughter of animals
in religious ceremonies but not for other purposes.
Members of the Church of Santeria, whose religious
practices include animal sacrifices, were prosecuted
under this statute. In 1993, the Supreme Court of the
United States held unanimously that the law violated
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.3
For at least the past 60 years, the chief threats
to religious liberty in America have come instead
from general laws or policies aimed at advancing
the common good that unintentionally burden
religious actors. These statutes rarely mention
specific religions or religious practices, but they
nonetheless prevent certain citizens from acting on
their religious convictions (or make it very costly
for them to do so).

At their best, Americans have opted for a third
way. In this situation, many states voluntarily created accommodations to allow prisoners to grow
very short beards if required to do so by their faith.4
Arkansas did not, but the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
unanimously that Congress’s Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 required
such an outcome.5 One major purpose of this act,
which was passed without objection in both houses of Congress, was to ensure that the religious
convictions of prisoners were accommodated
whenever possible.
Of course, not all religious practices should be
accommodated. Religious liberty is not an absolute trump card that empowers citizens to disregard laws. State and national governments there-
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fore have sometimes refused to protect religious
citizens, or have even withdrawn protections when
they determine that the actions in question are
extremely damaging to the common good. In 1878,
for instance, the Supreme Court refused to recognize a First Amendment right to engage in polygamy for religious reasons,6 and in the 20th century,
many states first accommodated parents who had
religious objections to providing medical treatment
for their children and then abolished these accommodations as it became evident that children were
dying from illnesses that medical advances had
rendered easily treatable.
Ultimately, there is no theoretical answer to the
question of which actions dictated by religious convictions should be protected and which should not.
This is a practical question to be decided prudentially
on a case-by-case basis. In deliberating about any
such case, civic leaders and jurists must balance a
concern for securing the common good with a mindfulness of the duties that citizens have to God and the
importance of allowing them to discharge them. Civic
friendship would also suggest that religious objectors be accommodated so long as doing so does not
imperil the common good.7
In the later part of the 20th century, the Supreme
Court developed a framework for thinking through
how to accommodate religious objectors to general laws. In 1963, under the leadership of liberal
Justice William J. Brennan, the Court adopted the
principle that government actions that burden a
religious practice must be justified by a compelling
state interest.8 Later, the Court added the requirement that this interest must be pursued in the least
restrictive manner possible.

In other words, citizens should not be forced
to violate their religious beliefs unless necessary.
Whenever possible, an accommodation should be
found. Although this test was developed to help
jurists interpret the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, it is also a useful guide for legislatively
crafted accommodations.9

Civic leaders and jurists must balance
a concern for securing the common
good with a mindfulness of the
duties that citizens have to God and
the importance of allowing them to
discharge them.
When a majority of Supreme Court Justices
repudiated this test with respect to interpreting the
Free Exercise clause in the 1990 case of Oregon v. Smith
(involving the use of an illegal drug in religious rituals),
Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA) of 1993 to restore it.10 It is noteworthy that
the bill was passed in the House without a dissenting
vote, was approved 97 to 3 by the Senate, and was
signed into law by President Bill Clinton.
RFRA stipulates that “Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even
if the burden results from a rule of general applicability” except “if it demonstrates that application
of the burden to the person” is “in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest” and “is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”11

6.

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).

7.

On similar grounds, one could argue for the protection of non-religious convictions that are at odds with the law. Legislatures and courts have
become better at doing this, but historically, religion has been specially protected in America.

8.

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).

9.

There is an extensive scholarly debate over whether America’s Founders intended the Free Exercise Clause to require accommodations. See,
for instance, Michael W. McConnell, “The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 103,
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The law was meant to apply to all levels of government, but in 1996, the Supreme Court ruled that
it could not be applied to the states. In response, 21
states have enacted RFRA laws of their own.12
Historically, there has been a broad consensus that
religious actors should be protected against otherwise
valid laws unless the state has a compelling interest.
Alas, this consensus may be unraveling. Robert P.
George, of Princeton University, observed in 2012 that
there is “a massive assault on religious liberty going on
in this country right now.”13 Although most civic leaders
and jurists remain committed to religious liberty in
the abstract, support for protecting citizens from
neutral laws that infringe upon religious convictions
has deteriorated.14
For instance, at the national level, the Obama
Administration showed little concern for religious
liberty when it required businesses to provide contraceptives and abortifacients to employees even
though they had religious convictions against doing
so. It also offered a rare challenge to the doctrine
of ministerial exception, a legal protection which
holds that religious groups should be free to choose,
in the words of Chief Justice John Roberts, “who
will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry
out their mission.”15 In both instances, the Supreme
Court rebuffed the Administration and protected
religious actors.16

At the state level, over the past several years, some
small-business owners who have religious objections
to participating in same-sex marriage ceremonies have
been prosecuted for declining to do so. Courts in these
states have given little weight to arguments that the
religious liberty provisions of state or national constitutions offer these photographers, florists, and bakers any
protection.17 In 2015, Indiana and Arkansas considered
bills similar to the national RFRA, at least in part to
help protect such citizens, a virtual firestorm erupted.

Although most civic leaders and jurists
remain committed to religious liberty
in the abstract, support for protecting
citizens from neutral laws that
infringe upon religious convictions
has deteriorated.
In the academy, professors Marci Hamilton and
Brian Leiter, among others, have made well-publicized arguments that religious citizens should seldom, if ever, be exempted from generally applicable
laws.18 On the legal front, others have contended that
religious accommodations (or at least some of them)
violate the Establishment Clause.19 With a few minor

12. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Other states have not enacted such laws, in some cases because courts in these states continue to
interpret their state constitutions to require strict scrutiny of laws restricting religious activities. For a helpful compilation of state RFRAs, see
National Conference of State Legislatures, “State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts,” June 5, 2015,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx (accessed September 1, 2015).
13.

Quoted in Brian Tashman, “Robert George Warns of Obama’s ‘Massive Assault on Religious Liberty,’” People for the American Way, Right
Wing Watch, February 15, 2012, http://www.rightwingwatch.org/content/robert-george-warns-obamas-massive-assault-religious-liberty
(accessed September 1, 2015).

14. See American Civil Liberties Union, “Using Religion to Discriminate,” https://www.aclu.org/feature/using-religion-discriminate
(accessed September 1, 2015), and Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Protect Thy Neighbor, “Protecting Our Neighbors,”
http://www.protectthyneighbor.org/ (accessed September 1, 2015).
15.

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012).

16. Ibid. and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
17.

See, for instance, Elane Photography, L.L.C v. Willock, 2013-NMSC-040, 309 P.3d 53 (concerning a photographer in New Mexico); In the
Matter of Melissa Elaine Klein, Interim Order, Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor and Industries, Case Nos. 44-14 and 45-14, January 29, 2015
(concerning bakers in Oregon); and State of Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, No. 13-2-008715, February 18, 2015 (concerning a florist in
Washington State).

18. Marci A. Hamilton, God vs. the Gavel: Religion and the Rule of Law, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), and Brian Leiter,
Why Tolerate Religion? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013).
19. See, for instance, Frederick Mark Gedicks and Rebecca G. Van Tassell, “RFRA Exceptions from the Contraception Mandate: An
Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion,” Harvard Civil Rights–Civil Liberties Law Review, Vol. 49, Issue 2 (Summer 2014), pp. 343–384.

exceptions,20 the Supreme Court has regularly rejected this argument, and legislators have seldom found
it persuasive.
Citizens, civic leaders, and jurists interested in
good public policy should look to history as a guide
to the impact of laws and constitutional provisions
aimed at protecting religious actors. This essay
shows that American civic leaders and jurists, at
both the national and state levels, have long created significant protections for religious Americans
who object to neutral, generally applicable laws.
Consideration of a range of policy areas reveals
that Americans, at their best, have agreed that governments should not force individuals to violate
their sincerely held religious convictions unless
they have compelling reasons for doing so. Moreover, the nation and the states have still been able
to achieve important policy objectives in spite of
these accommodations.

Military Service

Among the government’s many roles, few are as
important as national security. Virtually no one disputes that governments have an obligation to protect
their citizens from external threats. In the modern
era, states and nations have regularly relied upon
compulsory militia service or conscription to raise
armies. Religious pacifists often ask to be excused
from such service, but some countries have rejected
their pleas.
Most American colonies required adult males
to serve in the militia. Members of the Society of
Friends, better known as Quakers, were often pacifists who refused to do so. As early as the 1670s,
they requested to be excused from military service.
Rhode Island, North Carolina, and Maryland granted their requests, provided these pacifists paid a fine
or hired a substitute.21

Many colonies followed their example in the 18th
century, often expanding accommodations to include
other religious pacifists. During the War for Independence, the Continental Congress supported these accommodations with the following July 18, 1775, resolution:
As there are some people, who, from religious
principles, cannot bear arms in any case, this
Congress intend no violence to their consciences,
but earnestly recommend it to them, to contribute liberally in this time of universal calamity, to
the relief of their distressed brethren in the several colonies, and to do all other services to their
oppressed Country, which they can consistently
with their religious principles.22

Fourteen years later, during the debates in the
First Federal Congress over the Bill of Rights, James
Madison proposed a version of what became the
Second Amendment that stipulated that “no person
religiously scrupulous, shall be compelled to bear
arms.”23 Although largely forgotten today, this provision provoked almost as much recorded debate as the
First Amendment’s religion provisions. James Jackson, a Representative from Georgia, insisted that if
such an accommodation was made, then those accommodated should be required to hire a substitute.
According to newspaper accounts, Connecticut’s
Roger Sherman objected that it “is well-known that
those who are religiously scrupulous of bearing
arms, are equally scrupulous of getting substitutes or
paying an equivalent; many of them would rather die
than do either one or the other.” Sherman, however,
did not see an absolute necessity for a clause of this
kind. “We do not live under an arbitrary government,”
he said, “and the states respectively will have the
government of the militia, unless when called into
actual service.”24 Sherman was sympathetic to the

20. For instance, Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985). In this essay, I mention a number of cases in which accommodations
have not been held to violate the Establishment Clause, including two decided as late as 2015. For further discussion, see Laycock, “The
Religious Exemption Debate,” pp. 152–154, and Carl H. Esbeck, “Third-Party Burdens, Congressional Accommodations for Religion, and the
Establishment Clause,” testimony before the Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of
Representatives, February 13, 2015, http://clsnet.org/document.doc?id=829 (accessed September 1, 2015).
21.

Michael W. McConnell, “The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 103, No 7 (1990),
p. 1468.

22. Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed., Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1779 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1906), Vol. 5,
p. 189.
23. Quoted in Mark David Hall, Roger Sherman and the Creation of the American Republic (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 139.
24. Ibid.

plight of pacifists, but he preferred to rely on state and
federal legislatures to protect them rather than make
it a constitutional principle.
Madison’s proposal was approved by the House
but rejected by the Senate and thus did not make
it into the final text of what would become the Second Amendment. Madison and Sherman returned
to the issue two months later when Representatives
debated a bill regulating the militia when called into
national service. Madison offered an amendment to
protect from militia service “persons conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms.”
It is the glory of our country, said he, that a more
sacred regard to the rights of mankind is preserved,
than has heretofore been known. The Quaker merits some attention on this delicate point, liberty
of conscience: they had it in their own power to
establish their religion by law, they did not. He
was disposed to make the exception gratuitous,
but supposed it impracticable.25

Sherman immediately supported Madison’s
amendment, arguing that:
[T]he exemption of persons conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms [is] necessary and proper.
He was well convinced that there was no possibility of making such persons bear arms, they
would rather suffer death than commit what
appeared to them a moral evil—though it might
happen that the thing itself was not a moral evil;
yet their opinion served them as proof. As to their
being obliged to pay an equivalent, gentlemen
might see that this was as disagreeable to their
consciences as the other, he therefore thought it
advisable to exempt them as to both at present.26

The amended bill eventually was passed, although
with the requirement that conscientious objectors
must hire a substitute.27

Few men were as influential in crafting the U.S.
Constitution and Bill of Rights as Madison and Sherman. Their commitment to protecting religious citizens in this situation is surely noteworthy even if the
practical concerns that such accommodations could
undermine national security are understandable.
Throughout the 19th century, states often accommodated religious pacifists by permitting them to
hire a substitute or pay a fine instead of performing
military service.
Because states were the main source of soldiers for
America’s wars into the 20th century, religious pacifists were well, if not perfectly, protected. The nation’s
first conscription law in the 20th century, the Selective Draft Act of 1917, exempted from combat service
members of “any well-recognized religious sect or
organization at present organized and existing whose
creed or principles forbid its members to participate
in war in any form.”28 Instead of fighting, Quakers,
Mennonites, Brethren, and members of other historic peace churches were required to perform noncombat duties. If they refused to do so, which some
did as a matter of conscience, they were jailed.
A serious objection to the religious accommodation in the Selective Draft Act of 1917 is that it protected members of historic peace churches but not
pacifists from other traditions. In 1918, the Supreme
Court rejected the argument that this violated the
Establishment Clause in Arver v. United States.29
To the relief of other religious pacifists, Congress
broadened the accommodation in the Selective
Training and Service Act of 1940 to include anyone “who, by reason of religious training and belief,
is conscientiously opposed to participation to war
in any form.”30 Congress rejected arguments that
non-religious pacifists should be accommodated
as well and in 1948 defined the phrase “religious
training and belief” to mean “an individual’s belief
in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties
superior to those arising from any human relations, but [not including] essentially political, soci-

25. Ibid., p. 145 (emphasis added).
26. Ibid., pp. 144–145.
27. Ibid., p. 145.
28. Robert Miller and Ronald Flowers, Towards Benevolent Neutrality: Church, State, and the Supreme Court, 5th ed.
(Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 1996), Vol. 2, p. 642.
29. Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
30. Miller and Flowers, Towards Benevolent Neutrality, Vol. 2, p. 644.

ological, or philosophical views or merely personal
moral code.”31
The exercise of religion is specially protected by
the United States Constitution, and it is not unreasonable for Congress or state legislatures to accommodate religious citizens. Yet it is also reasonable to
insist that non-religious individuals who have similar
convictions be given similar accommodations. Congress has refused to do this with respect to military
service, but the Supreme Court effectively read the
Selective Service Act to require such accommodations in United States v. Seeger32 and Welsh v. United
States.33 To this day, however, the U.S. Code limits
conscientious objector status to religious pacifists:
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed
to require any person to be subject to combatant
training and service in the armed forces of the
United States who, by reason of religious training
and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. As used in this subsection,
the term “religious training and belief” does not
include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code.34

Not every religious conviction should be accommodated, and it is worth noting that Congress never
created an accommodation for selective conscientious objectors (individuals who object to a particular
war but not all wars). In Gillette v. United States,35 the
Supreme Court ruled that the Free Exercise Clause
did not require an accommodation for such citizens.
Similarly, Congress and the Supreme Court have
refused to exempt religious pacifists from paying the
portion of their taxes that supports the military.36
The United States has a significant interest in
ensuring that personnel needs are met during time of
war and that the burdens of conscription are shared
fairly. The military’s needs were severely stretched
in World War I and World War II, yet Congress saw
fit to exempt religious pacifists from military service,

and America, along with her allies, was able to win
both conflicts. Personnel needs were met more easily in the Korean and Vietnam Wars as the nation
was far from full mobilization. If the United States
did not win these wars, it was not due to accommodations granted to religious pacifists.

Swearing Oaths

Historically, oaths have been seen as essential
for ensuring the loyalty and fidelity of citizens and
elected officials. They were also viewed as critically
important for the effective functioning of judicial
systems. In his famous Farewell Address, President
George Washington wrote that:
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, Religion and morality are indisputable supports…. A volume could not trace all their
connections with private and public felicity. Let it
simply be asked where is the security for property,
for reputation, for life, if the sense of religious obligation desert the oaths, which are the instruments
of investigation in Courts of Justice?37

In the Christian West, oaths usually invoke God
as the witness of the oath taker’s veracity; written
oaths often end with the phrase “so help me God.”
The state obviously has an interest both in the loyalty of its citizens and elected officials and in having
a reliable judicial system.
Members of the Society of Friends objected to the
taking of oaths as early as the 1650s. Simply put, they
took (and take) literally such biblical passages as Matthew 5:33–5:37, where Jesus says: “Swear not at all….
But let your communication be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay: for
whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.”
In England, Quakers were routinely jailed for
failing to swear oaths in courts or, after the Revolution of 1688, to take oaths promising loyalty to the
new regime. In the 1690s, Parliament agreed to let
Quakers offer an “affirmation” rather than an oath

31. Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 645.
32. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
33. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
34. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j).
35. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
36. U.S. v. American Friends Service Committee, 419 U.S. 7 (1974).
37. Dreisbach and Hall, The Sacred Rights of Conscience, p. 468 (emphasis in original).

in some cases, but they still faced numerous disabilities. For instance, they were not permitted to
be witnesses in criminal cases or to hold civic offices because of their unwillingness to take oaths. In
addition to Quakers, many Moravians, Mennonites,
and Brethren in Christ have religious objections to
taking oaths.
The lot of Quakers and other groups who refused
to take oaths varied widely in early America. As one
might expect, Pennsylvania, which was founded
by the Quaker William Penn, routinely permitted
citizens to affirm rather than swear. Other colonies,
including Massachusetts, Maryland, and Virginia,
banned Quakers altogether and certainly did not
tolerate their refusal to take oaths. However, due to
Parliament’s 1689 Act of Toleration, colonies were
forced to tolerate Quakers and even to accommodate
their convictions. By 1710, all of the American colonies allowed Quakers to reside within their borders,
and many had begun to permit them to use affirmations instead of oaths. New York permitted Quakers
to testify by affirmation in civil cases in 1691, and
other colonies adopted similar or broader accommodations, including Maryland (1702); New Jersey
(1722); and even Massachusetts (1743).38
By the Founding era, all states permitted Quakers and other religious minorities to affirm rather
than swear, although many states retained the language of “so help me God” when stipulating how an
oath or affirmation was to be taken. The most liberal accommodation was found in Rhode Island,
which permitted officeholders to swear or affirm
but in some cases gave officials the option of saying
“this affirmation I make and give upon the peril of
the penalty of perjury.”39 Presumably, this was to
accommodate atheists and others who did not want
to say “so help me God.”
It is important to note that the Act of Toleration,
which initially had forced American colonies to tolerate Quakers, was no longer binding on the new
American states. Moreover, Quakers were a minority in every state and had little political power anywhere in America after the mid-18th century.
The most famous oath accommodations from this
era may be found in the United States Constitution.
Articles I, II, and VI permit individuals either to swear

or to affirm. The best-known of these provisions is
Article II, Section 1, which reads: “Before he [the
President] enter on the execution of his office, he shall
take the following oath or affirmation: ‘I do solemnly swear, (or affirm,) that I will faithfully execute….’”
Even more significant is Article VI’s requirement that
Senators and Representatives “and the members of
the several State legislatures, and all executive and
judicial officers, both of the United States and of the
several States, shall be bound, by oath or affirmation,
to support this Constitution.”
Of course, one does not need to be religious to
take advantage of these provisions, but in the context
in which they were written, there is little doubt that
these accommodations were intended for Quakers and
others who had religious objections to taking oaths.
There is no reason to believe that exempting
Quakers and others from oath requirements has had
a detrimental effect on the judicial system at either
the state or national level. Nor is there evidence that
these citizens have been less loyal to America than
other groups. It is also worth noting that in the 18th
century, many Quakers became very successful merchants in part because they were known to be particularly trustworthy in spite of their unwillingness to
take oaths.

Mandatory School Attendance

In the 19th century, civic leaders in many states
advocated compulsory education laws and creation
of public school systems. One motivation behind
this movement was the desire for children to learn
such basic skills as reading, writing, and arithmetic.
Today, there is broad agreement that education is one
of the most important services provided by government. Some critics of public schools argue that the
government should fund private education as well, but
virtually no one contends that states should revoke
compulsory attendance laws or eliminate funding
for education.
In addition to teaching basic skills, many 19th century reformers wanted public education to help turn
the large waves of immigrants into good, democratic,
and Protestant Americans. When Catholics objected to requirements that they send their children to
what were effectively Protestant schools, they were

38. McConnell, “The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion,” pp. 1467–1468.
39. John D. Cushing, ed., First Laws of the State of Rhode Island (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1983), pp. 142, 148, and passim.

charged with being “sectarian,” and Protestant civic
leaders were not amused by Catholic attempts to
receive a share of state education funding.40
As biased as public schools tended to be toward Protestantism in the 19th century, it was rare for states to
require Catholics and other dissenters to attend them.
Oregon famously attempted to achieve such an outcome by banning all private schools in 1922. Although
the initiative did not specifically prohibit Catholic
schools, virtually every private school in the state at the
time was Roman Catholic. In 1925, the U.S. Supreme
Court declared the law to be a violation of the right of
parents to control their children’s education.41
Public schools became noticeably less Protestant (or, for that matter, religious) with the advent
of the Supreme Court’s modern Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. Notably, teacher-led prayer
was declared to be unconstitutional in 1962,42 as
was devotional Bible reading in 1963.43 Parents who
wanted to send their children to religious schools
were free to do so, provided they could afford private
school tuition. In some cases, states attempted to aid
these schools, but much of this aid was declared to be
unconstitutional in the 1970s and 1980s.44 Because
the licensing of private schools was often onerous
and homeschooling was rare at this time, parents
who desired a religious education for their children
were often unable to provide one.
Included among these parents were a group of
Amish who lived in New Glarus, Wisconsin. These
families did not object to sending their children to
public schools through the eighth grade, but they
refused to send them to the public high school.
Although Amish generally do not go to court to
resolve disputes, an attorney acting on their behalf
objected that the Free Exercise Clause required the
state to exempt them from the state’s compulsory

attendance law. In 1972, a unanimous Supreme Court
(with a partial dissent by Justice Douglas) agreed.45

States have a powerful interest in
ensuring that children are educated.
Yet since the early 1980s, they have
been increasingly willing to craft
exemptions from compulsory
attendance laws.
Since 1972, states have liberalized their compulsory
attendance laws and their regulation of private schools
and homeschooling so that it is far easier to remove
children from public schools. Moreover, the Supreme
Court has allowed states to increase aid to these schools,
thus making them more affordable.46 These laws were
changed for a complex set of reasons, but among them
was the desire of legislators to accommodate citizens
who desire a faith-based education for their children.
States have a powerful interest in ensuring that
children are educated. Yet since the early 1980s, they
have been increasingly willing to craft exemptions
from compulsory attendance laws. Because students
educated at home or in private schools regularly outperform students in public schools, it seems reasonable to conclude that such accommodations have not
had a detrimental effect on the quality of education
in these states.47

Laws Requiring “Religious” Acts

Since the advent of the Supreme Court’s modern
Establishment Clause jurisprudence in 1947, it has
been almost impossible to think that a state would
require individuals to support a religious institution

40. Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State (Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 191–284.
41.

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).

42. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
43. Abington v Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
44. See, for instance, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); and School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373 (1985).
45. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
46. See, for instance, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), which upheld Ohio’s school voucher program.
47. See, for instance, Joseph Murphy, Homeschooling in America: Capturing and Assessing the Movement (Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin, 2012); Henry
Braun, Frank Jenkins, and Wendy Grigg, National Assessment of Educational Progress (2006),
http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pubs/studies/2006461.asp (accessed November 20, 2014).

or conduct a religious exercise. This, however, has
not always been the case.
In the early American colonies, from north to
south, many civic leaders believed that the state
should favor a particular denomination and/or
encourage Christianity. States with established
churches often required everyone, including nonadherents, to fund them. Thanks in part to Parliament’s Act of Toleration, colonial governments began
to craft accommodations that allowed dissenters to
support their own churches rather than the established church, but independence from Great Britain
opened the possibility that states could revoke these
accommodations. Fortunately for religious dissenters, by this time, even many supporters of establishments had come to the conclusion that individuals
should not be required to support churches to which
they did not belong.48
For instance, Patrick Henry’s famous 1784 Bill for
Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian
Religion would have required individuals to support
their own churches while exempting the Quakers and
Mennonites (who objected to any state involvement)
from this requirement. When Connecticut revised
its statutes in 1783, the state continued to favor the
Congregational church, but dissenting Protestants
were permitted to direct their ecclesiastical taxes to
their own churches (a provision that was unfair to
non-Protestants, of which there were virtually none
in the state, but useful to the Anglicans, Baptists, and
Quakers who resided there).49 In each case, supporters believed that establishments promoted the common good but were willing to accommodate most (if
not all) religious dissenters.
Yet these accommodations did not satisfy all dissenters. Many believers considered supporting their
clergy and houses of worship to be a religious duty.
For the government to involve itself in such matters, even if the state merely required them to support their own churches, was considered by some to
violate their right to religious liberty.50 Eventually,

debates on these matters were mooted when states
voluntarily abolished their religious establishments.
Over the past 150 years, states have rarely passed
statutes explicitly requiring individuals to participate in religious acts, but several states did so inadvertently as America headed into the Second World
War. In order to promote national unity, a number
of states passed laws requiring school children to
salute and pledge allegiance to the American flag.
Most Americans have no objection to these practices, but Jehovah’s Witnesses believe that they violate
the Bible’s command not to worship graven images
(e.g., Exodus 20:4–5). In 1940, eight Justices ruled
that the states’ interest in promoting national unity
permitted them to override these objections.51

Religious liberty protects the ability
of citizens to worship or not worship
according to the dictates of their own
consciences, not the consciences
of others.
Three years later, the Court returned to this
issue. In a stunning reversal, six Justices concluded
that states could not compel Jehovah’s Witnesses
to engage in these acts. In oft-quoted words, Justice
Robert H. Jackson averred:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of
political controversy, to place them beyond the
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the
courts. One’s right to life, liberty, and property, to
free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and
assembly, and other fundamental rights may not
be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome
of no elections.52

48. Of course, many civic leaders had come to oppose establishments altogether. See, for instance, Dreisbach and Hall, The Sacred Rights of
Conscience, pp. 250–252 and 307–313.
49. Ibid., pp. 252–253 and 246–247; Hall, Roger Sherman and the Creation of the American Republic, pp. 83–90.
50. See, for instance, Isaac Backus, “An Appeal to the Public for Religious Liberty” (1773), and John Leland, “The Rights of Conscience Inalienable”
(1791), in Dreisbach and Hall, The Sacred Rights of Conscience, pp. 204–211 and 335–345.
51. Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
52. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).

After considering the state’s interest in forcing
students to salute the flag, Jackson concluded that:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion, or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an
exception, they do not now occur to us.53

Justice Jackson’s opinion relies on multiple provisions from the Bill of Rights and can certainly be read
to protect both religious and non-religious citizens,
but his argument is particularly compelling with
respect to state laws that command people to participate in what they consider to be religious actions
with which they disagree. That most Americans do
not view saluting the flag and pledging allegiance to it
as equivalent to worshiping a graven image was properly determined by the Court to be completely irrelevant. Religious liberty protects the ability of citizens
to worship or not worship according to the dictates of
their own consciences, not the consciences of others.

Laws Banning Alcohol and Drug Use

The abuse of alcohol and drugs has led to untold
problems throughout American history. Colonial
Americans sought to regulate alcohol, and in the 19th
century, a powerful movement arose to ban it altogether. In 1919, the U.S. Constitution was amended
to prohibit alcohol. Congress passed the Volstead
Act the same year to implement this amendment.
For our purposes, of particular interest is Congress’s
approach to the issue of sacramental wine.
Sensitive to traditional religious belief that wine
should be used for the Eucharist (also known as Communion) and other ceremonies, Congress crafted an
exemption to the Volstead Act. The language of Title II,
Section 6 of this law alludes to two major religious traditions but is broad enough to cover others. It begins:

Nothing in this title shall be held to apply to the
manufacture, sale, transportation, importation,
possession, or distribution of wine for sacramental purposes, or like religious rites…. No person
to whom a permit may be issued to manufacture,
transport, import, or sell wines for sacramental
purposes or like religious rites shall sell, barter,
exchange, or furnish any such to any person not
a rabbi, minister of the gospel, priest, or an officer duly authorized for the purpose by any church
or congregation, nor to any such except upon an
application duly subscribed by him, which application, authenticated as regulations may prescribe, shall be filed and preserved by the seller.54

The text of the bill makes it clear that Congress was
committed to protecting religious beliefs held alike by
large denominations (e.g., Roman Catholics) and small
religious bodies (e.g., Jews) who believed that sacramental wine should be used in religious ceremonies.55
Far more difficult for legislators and courts have
been the claims of citizens who contend that the use
of regulated substances is part of their religious practices. Particularly well-known is the case of Native
Americans who use peyote in religious ceremonies. Although peyote is a controlled substance, the
national government recognized its legitimate use in
“bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American Church” in 1966.56 Some states adopted similar
accommodations, but Oregon did not.
In Oregon v. Smith, the Supreme Court ruled that
the First Amendment does not shield Native Americans or others who use peyote in religious ceremonies
from neutral, generally applicable laws. Shortly after
Smith was decided, Oregon passed a statute protecting
the right of individuals (not just Native Americans) to
use peyote in religious ceremonies. In 1994, without
any recorded objections, Congress amended the American Indian Religious Freedom Act to protect Native
Americans in 22 states that did not permit Native
Americans to use peyote in religious ceremonies.

53. Ibid., p. 642.
54. Public Law 66-66, National Prohibition Act (Volstead Act), 66th Cong., 1st Sess., October 28, 1919,
http://www.legisworks.org/congress/66/publaw-66.pdf (accessed September 3, 2015).
55. Many states continue to exempt sacramental wine from general laws prohibiting adults (other than parents or guardians) from serving alcohol
to minors. See, for instance, Oregon Revised Statutes, 471.430.
56. 31 Fed. Reg. 4679 (1966); 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31.

As noted, the abuse of drugs and alcohol has
caused a great deal of damage throughout American
history. At different times and in different ways, the
national and state governments have attempted to
prohibit alcohol and certain drugs. There have been
extensive debates about the efficacy of these endeavors, but there is no reason to believe that accommodations crafted by legislatures to permit the sacramental use of wine, peyote, or other controlled
substances57 by religious citizens have been detrimental to public health. From a historical perspective, these accommodations fit well with similar laws
crafted to protect religious practitioners.

Laws Requiring Medical Treatment

Traditionally, states and the national government
have deferred to individuals and families to make their
own medical decisions. As medical knowledge improved
during the 19th century, it became evident that the
decisions of some individuals could have an impact on
others. Particularly contested in the late 19th and early
20th centuries were laws mandating vaccinations.
Advocates of vaccinations contended that they
are necessary both for the health of the individuals
vaccinated and for the well-being of others. If some
individuals and families refuse vaccinations, the
argument went, others would suffer from the spread
of disease. In 1905, the Supreme Court ruled that the
state’s interest in protecting the “health and safety of
the people” was sufficiently weighty to override the
liberty of citizens to refuse a vaccine.58
Today, all 50 states have laws requiring specified vaccines for students. States usually require vaccination
as a prerequisite to attending school, but every state
except Mississippi, West Virginia, and California grants
exemptions for parents who have religious convictions
against immunizations. Eighteen states also allow phil-

osophical exemptions for those who object to immunizations because of personal, moral, or other beliefs.59
The health and safety of citizens is a vital state
interest, yet there is little reason to believe that accommodating citizens who have religious objections to
vaccinations has caused significant harm. However,
a 2015 spike in measles cases in California linked to
unvaccinated adults and children clearly caused some
harm. In response to several outbreaks, state legislators revoked the religious and philosophical exemptions to California’s vaccination requirement.60
Reconsidering previously granted accommodations
is certainly appropriate, but a better option might have
been to remove only the philosophical exemption and
make the religious one more difficult to obtain. This
would have protected both the state’s interest in public health and the religious liberty of the relatively few
citizens who have sincere religious objections to vaccination requirements. An added benefit is that it would
prevent some families from withdrawing their children
from schools to avoid the vaccination requirement.
As has been repeatedly stipulated, not all religious convictions should be accommodated. In the
early to mid-20th century, followers of Mary Baker
Eddy, commonly known as Christian Scientists, lobbied successfully for exemptions from state laws that
require parents to provide medical treatment for
their children. Tragically, hundreds of children died
because of easily treatable diseases. As a result, many
states properly repealed or revised their exceptions.61

Medical Providers

Perhaps the most contentious and difficult political-moral-legal issue over the past half-century has
been abortion. Large numbers of Americans consider it tantamount to murder, whereas others insist
that access to the procedure is a fundamental consti-

57. See, for instance, Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (protecting the ability of members of the
Brazilian church União do Vegetal to use hallucinogenic tea).
58. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
59. See National Conference of State Legislatures, “States with Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from School Immunization Requirements,”
July 6, 2015, http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/school-immunization-exemption-state-laws.aspx (accessed September 1, 2015).
60. See, for instance, Rosanna Xia, Rong-Gong Lin II, and Sandra Poindexter, “Fewer California Parents Refuse to Vaccinate Children,” Los Angeles
Times, January 23, 2015, http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-immunization-data-20150123-story.html
(accessed September 1, 2015); Kristin A. Feemster, “Eliminate Vaccine Exemptions,” The New York Times, March 23, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/03/23/making-vaccination-mandatory-for-all-children/eliminate-vaccine-exemptions
(accessed September 1, 2015); California SB 277, June 30, 2015.
61. Alan Rogers, The Child Cases: How America’s Religious Exemption Laws Harm Children (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2014);
Hamilton, God vs. The Gavel, pp. 38–83.

tutional right. Some activists believe that the state
financial assistance, certifications, or licenses they
or private employers should be able to force mediwould otherwise receive but for their refusal.64
cal providers to perform abortions even if they have
sincere religious beliefs against doing so. The advent
While not limited to institutions that oppose
of emergency contraceptives/abortifacients such as these practices for religious reasons, there is little
Plan B and Ella raise similar issues with respect to doubt that an important motivation behind this act
was protecting religious actors.
pharmacists filling prescriptions.
In 1973, shortly after Roe v. Wade was decided, Congress passed the Church Amendment to protect health
care professionals. The legislation prohibits any court It is noteworthy that many (but not
or public official from using the receipt of federal aid all) states specify that their conscience
to require a person or institution to perform an aborclauses protect individuals who
tion or sterilization contrary to their “religious beliefs
or moral convictions.”62 The amendment also makes object to abortions on moral or
it illegal for health care organizations to discriminate religious grounds.
against individuals who refuse to perform these procedures. In arguing in favor of these protections, Senator Frank Church (D–ID) remarked that:
Like Congress, numerous states protect health care
providers who have objections to performing certain
[N]othing is more fundamental to our national
procedures. According to the National Abortion Rights
birthright than freedom of religion. Religious belief
Action League (NARAL), “47 states and the District of
must remain above the reach of secular authority. It
Columbia [have] passed laws that permit certain medical personnel, health facilities, and/or institutions to
is the duty of Congress to fashion the law in such a
refuse
to provide abortion care.”65 Only Alabama, New
manner that no Federal funding of hospitals, medHampshire, and Vermont do not have such laws.66
ical research, or medical care may be conditioned
63
upon the violation of religious precepts.
It is noteworthy that many (but not all) states
specify that their conscience clauses protect individSubsequent Congresses expanded these protec- uals who object to abortions on “moral or religious
tions. For instance, in 1996, Congress passed the grounds.”67 Some of these statutes offer better protection for religious liberty than others, but overall,
Danforth Amendment, according to which:
both the national and state governments have made
significant
efforts to protect the ability of health care
[T]he federal, state, and local governments [were
professionals to act (or not act) according to their
prohibited] from discriminating against healthcare
religious convictions in these policy areas.
entities that refuse to (1) undergo abortion training,
Over the past 15 years, heated debates have aris(2) provide such training, (3) perform abortions, or
en
about various types of emergency contraception
(4) provide referrals for training or abortions. Specifically, it protected doctors, medical students, and
(EC). Some activists claim they merely prevent conception, whereas others contend that they can cause
health training programs from being denied federal
62. Quoted in Robin Fretwell Wilson, “Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage from the Healthcare Context,” in Same Sex Marriage
and Religious Liberty, ed. Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., and Robin Fretwell Wilson (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008),
p. 83.
63. Quoted in Robin Fretwell Wilson, “When Governments Insulate Dissenters from Social Change: What Hobby Lobby and Abortion Conscience
Clauses Teach About Specific Exemptions,” UC Davis Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 2 (2014), p. 735.
64. Wilson, “Matters of Conscience,” p. 85.
65. NARAL, “Refusal Laws: Dangerous for Women’s Health” p. 1, http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/media/fact-sheets/abortion-refusal-clausesdangerous.pdf (accessed September 1, 2015).
66. Ibid., p. 8. Cf. Guttmacher Institute, “State Policies in Brief: Refusing to Provide Health Services,” February 1, 2015, p. 3,
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RPHS.pdf (accessed February 17, 2015).
67. Wilson, “Matters of Conscience,” p. 300 (emphasis added), and, generally, pp. 299–310.

abortions.68 Some health care providers who believe
that ECs can cause abortions and thus end innocent
human lives have refused to administer or fill prescriptions for these drugs. With respect to pharmacies,
some states permit individual pharmacists to refuse
to fill these prescriptions as long as another pharmacist is available to do so. Others permit pharmacies
themselves to refuse to carry such drugs (particularly
relevant for small, family-owned pharmacies). Currently, between 16 and 22 states (depending on how
one interprets broadly worded statutes in six states)
protect health care providers and/or pharmacists
from having to provide ECs.69
A closely related issue concerns state and federal
requirements that employers pay for various types
of contraception, including ECs. Some employers
have refused to provide health plans covering such
drugs. States have moved to protect the consciences of such individuals and entities in different ways.
According to NARAL, of the 28 states that require
health insurance to cover controversial forms of
contraception, 20 exempt employers from doing so
if they have religious or moral convictions against
these drugs.70
At the national level, acting under the authority
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
of 2010 (the Affordable Care Act), the Department
of Health and Human Services mandated that businesses cover a range of contraceptive devices, including ECs. Religious denominations and houses of worship were exempted from these requirements, but
other religious organizations were not.
In response to significant outcry, the Obama
Administration issued regulations whereby insurance
providers used by religious organizations would offer

these drugs at no cost (in theory) to the religious organizations’ employees. Some religious organizations
were satisfied by this approach, but others believed
they were still complicit in wrongdoing. For-profit
businesses received no such protection, but in 2014,
the Supreme Court held in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., that the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act requires such an accommodation for a closely held
for-profit corporation.71

Protecting religious actors who are
licensed by the state to provide medical
services is one of the most complicated
policy areas in which religious citizens
have been accommodated.
There is no denying that protecting religious
actors who are licensed by the state to provide
medical services is one of the most complicated
policy areas in which religious citizens have been
accommodated. In some instances, such as with ECs,
even the basic effect of the drug is debated. Even when
it is not, the state’s interest in regulating the provision
of medical care, which can involve issues of life and
death, is undoubtedly high. These cases are further
complicated because they raise equal protection
issues and sometimes concern what the Supreme
Court has called a fundamental right to abortion. It
is telling that in spite of these complications, the
nation and many states have gone to great lengths to
protect the moral and religious convictions of health
care providers.

68. Evaluating these medical claims goes beyond the scope of this paper, although I will suggest that Robin Fretwell Wilson’s observation that “[s]
ome forms of ECs appear sometimes to act after fertilization as ‘contragestives,’ meaning they destroy a fertilized egg” seems to me to be a
sensible and balanced conclusion. Robin Fretwell Wilson, “The Erupting Clash Between Religion and the State over Contraception, Sterilization
and Abortion,” in Allen D. Herzke, ed. Religious Freedom in America: Constitutional Roots and Contemporary Challenges
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2015), p. 137.
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71.

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. ___ (2014). The ACA does contain a religious conscience exemption aimed at protecting members
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Time and experience may reveal that some of applied for a job at the clothing store Abercrombie
the accommodations mentioned in this section & Fitch but was not hired because her scarf violatare harmful. Although some advocacy groups fear ed the company’s dress code. Although she had not
that these accommodations will lead to great harm, explicitly requested an exception from the dress
there has been little evidence that this is the case.72 policy at her job interview, the Supreme Court ruled
If substantial evidence arises that some of the by a margin of eight to one that Title VII “prohibpolicies mentioned in this section are detrimental its a prospective employer from refusing to hire an
to the well-being of patients, legislatures may applicant in order to avoid accommodating a relihave to rethink existing accommodations. If such gious practice that it could accommodate without
evidence does not surface, however, legislatures undue hardship.”74
in states without accommodations should move
Many Americans agree that employers should not
quickly to protect the religious liberty of all citizens be able to discriminate on the basis of religious pracmore effectively.
tices such as wearing a headscarf, a yarmulke, or a
turban. Yet the Congress that passed Title VII recognized that some religious discrimination is acceptable
Civil Rights Laws
As we have seen, the national and state governments and protected by the First Amendment. Accordingly,
often create accommodations to protect religious it crafted an accommodation to Title VII that permits
individuals from neutral, generally applicable laws, religious institutions to make employment decisions
but such accommodations—and many more could on the basis of religion. Specifically, “a religious corpobe discussed—do not exhaust the state’s interest ration, association, educational institution, or society”
in protecting religious citizens. For instance, is exempt “with respect to the employment of individulegislators have passed laws to protect religious als of a particular religion to perform work connected
citizens from discrimination by both private and with the carrying on by such corporation, association,
governmental entities.
educational institution, or society of its activities.”75
Most prominently, Title VII of the Civil Rights
As a result, the Roman Catholic Church can insist
Act of 1964, as amended, prohibits employers with that only faithful Roman Catholics run its hospitals,
more than 15 employees from (among other things) an evangelical college may require its employees to
refusing to hire or firing someone because of their be committed evangelicals, and a Jewish social serreligion or religious practices. The statute also vice agency may decide to employ only orthodox
requires private businesses to make “reasonable Jews. To prohibit religious institutions from making
accommodations” for their employees’ or poten- such decisions, Congress reasoned, would constitute
tial employees’ sincerely held religious convictions a grave threat to religious liberty.76
unless the accommodation would create an undue
Today, it is not uncommon for activist organizahardship for the employer.73
tions such as the American Civil Liberties Union to
Religious Americans, especially religious minor- contend that religious individuals and institutions
ities, indisputably have benefited from this law. should rarely be exempted from neutral, generally
In 2014, for example, Samantha Elauf, a Muslim applicable laws.77 Fortunately, legislators in even the
woman who wore a headscarf for religious reasons most secular of states often disagree. For instance,
72. Luke W. Goodrich, “The Health Care and Conscience Debate,” Engage: The Journal of the Federalist Society’s Practice Groups, Vol. 12, Issue 1
(June 2011), pp. 122–123 (on the lack of evidence that conscience protections “undermine access to health care or harm women’s health”).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000). For a general overview how Title VII protects religious Americans, see “Section
12: Religious Discrimination,” in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Compliance Manual, 2008,
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/religion.html (accessed September 1, 2015).
74. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. ___ (2015),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/14-86_p86b.pdf (accessed September 1, 2015).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(1)(a) (2000).
76. Religious liberty concerns prompted Congress similarly to carve out religious institutions from the mandates of the Fair Housing Act, the
Americans with Disabilities Act, and Title IX of the Educational Amendments Act of 1972.
77. See, for instance, American Civil Liberties Union, “Using Religion to Discriminate.”

before the Supreme Court redefined marriage for the
entire country, some states had passed statutes recognizing same-sex marriage that also protected religious
organizations from being compelled to participate in
them if it violated their doctrine. Washington State’s
law recognizing same-sex marriage stipulates that:
(4) …No state agency or local government may
base a decision to penalize, withhold benefits
from, or refuse to contract with any religious
organization on the refusal of a person associated with such religious organization to solemnize or recognize a marriage under this section.
(5) No religious organization is required to
provide accommodations, facilities, advantages, privileges, services, or goods related to
the solemnization or celebration of a marriage.
(6) A religious organization shall be immune from
any civil claim or cause of action, including a claim
pursuant to chapter 49.60 RCW, based on its refusal to provide accommodations, facilities, advantages, privileges, services, or goods related to the solemnization or celebration of a marriage.78

One shortcoming of the Washington statute is that
it does not protect small-business owners who have
sincere religious convictions that likewise prevent
them from participating in same-sex wedding ceremonies. They should also be protected by carefully
crafted accommodations. As we have seen, governments regularly create such accommodations and still
manage to meet important policy objectives.

Conclusion

Religious liberty is a core American principle—not
a Democratic or Republican one. Many of the accommodations discussed in this essay were passed with
significant bipartisan support. Both conservative
and liberal jurists have supported judicially created
accommodations. As the nation and states address
new threats to what the American Founders called
“the sacred rights of conscience,” they should carefully consider the lessons of the past as they make laws
and policies for the future.
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78. RCW 26.04.010. Congress passed a similar provision to protect military chaplains. Section 544 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
2012 reads: “A military chaplain who, as a matter of conscience or moral principle, does not wish to perform a marriage, may not be required
to do so.” See Section 544, “Freedom of Conscience of Military Chaplains with Respect to the Performance of Marriages,” in National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Public Law 112-81, December 31, 2011,
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